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Denying Secured Creditors the Right to  
Credit Bid in Chapter 11 Cases and the  
Risk of Undervaluation 
Alan N. Resnick* 
The Bankruptcy Code has reached a delicate balance between protecting the rights of 
secured creditors and providing financially troubled companies with flexibility in 
reorganizing their businesses. One protection that has been available to secured creditors is 
the right to “credit bid” at any sale of collateral free of liens, which allows the creditor to buy 
the property by offsetting its claim against the purchase price instead of paying cash. This 
right is designed to assure that property is not sold free of security interests at a price that is 
below the collateral’s true value. An inadequate sales price deprives the creditor of the full 
benefit of its security interest. The importance of credit bidding has grown as asset sales have 
become more common in chapter 11 cases. 
 
Despite the universal view during the past three decades that the right to credit bid was 
essentially guaranteed when property is sold under a chapter 11 plan, two recent 
controversial decisions—the Fifth Circuit’s decision in In re Pacific Lumber Co. and the 
Third Circuit’s decision in In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC—curtailed this protection 
by holding that a secured lender may be denied the right to credit bid when its collateral is 
sold under a chapter 11 plan if the bankruptcy court makes a judicial finding that the 
creditor will realize the “indubitable equivalent” of its secured claim without credit bidding.  
 
These recent circuit court decisions have shifted the balance between the rights of lien 
holders and the rights of financially troubled borrowers in a way that affords less protection 
to secured creditors and greater flexibility to chapter 11 debtors. This Article analyzes these 
cases and discusses the impact these decisions will have on the chapter 11 sale process, 
creditor expectations and behavior, and the cost and availability of credit. This Article will 
also discuss the recent Seventh Circuit decision in River Road Hotel Partners, LLC v. 
Amalgamated Bank, which rejected the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Philadelphia 
Newspapers, thereby causing a circuit split. The Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to 
review the Seventh Circuit decision, is likely to resolve these important issues soon. 
 
 * Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra University School 
of Law; of counsel to Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, New York. The Author gratefully 
acknowledges the valuable assistance of Daniel Vaillant, an associate, and Keely Hamlin, a summer 
associate, at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, in the preparation of this Article. 
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Introduction 
A goal of chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is the preservation of 
value of a distressed company through reorganization or a sale of the 
company’s assets. This goal often conflicts with property rights of entities 
that are not in bankruptcy. In striving to save businesses, thereby saving 
jobs and maximizing recovery for creditors, the Bankruptcy Code has 
reached a delicate balance between the protection of property rights of 
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lien holders and the maximization of value for the benefit of all 
stakeholders in the enterprise. 
The protection of property rights in a bankruptcy case is not merely 
a matter of legislative preference or economic policy. In Louisville Joint 
Stock Land Bank v. Radford, the Supreme Court held that a 
prebankruptcy security interest in property of a debtor is constitutionally 
protected by the Fifth Amendment.1 Since that landmark decision, courts 
have held that impairment of a secured creditor’s lien position by reason 
of the bankruptcy laws constitutes an impermissible taking of property 
without just compensation.2 
The constitutional protection of property rights does not mean, 
however, that secured creditors are unscathed during the reorganization 
process. In furthering its value-maximization and reorganization policies, 
the Bankruptcy Code infringes on the rights of secured creditors in a 
number of ways. For example, the automatic stay under section 362(a) 
prohibits foreclosure by a secured creditor upon the debtor’s default,3 a 
right the secured creditor would have under applicable state law.4 A 
secured creditor also may have to tolerate the debtor’s substitution of its 
collateral with other property.5 A secured creditor on a debt that 
matured before the filing of the bankruptcy petition also may be 
compelled under a plan of reorganization to accept deferred cash 
payments over a period of several years with interest at a rate that is 
lower than the rate applicable in the absence of bankruptcy.6 All of these 
impositions on a secured creditor’s rights in the debtor’s property, among 
others, can be achieved over the objection of the secured creditor. As the 
Supreme Court has written:  
  Property rights do not gain any absolute inviolability in the 
bankruptcy court because created and protected by state law. Most 
property rights are so created and protected. But if Congress is acting 
within its bankruptcy power, it may authorize the bankruptcy court to 
affect these property rights, provided the limitations of the due process 
clause are observed.7 
 
 1. 295 U.S. 555, 589 (1935) (“The bankruptcy power, like the other great substantive powers of 
Congress, is subject to the Fifth Amendment.”).  
 2. See, e.g., Chem. Bank v. Am. Kitchen Foods, Inc. (In re Am. Kitchen Foods, Inc.), 2 Bankr. 
Ct. Dec. 715, 719 (Bankr. D. Me. 1976). 
 3. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2010). 
 4. U.C.C. § 9-601(a)(1) (2011). 
 5. The Bankruptcy Code recognizes that a secured creditor may be “adequately protected” by 
receiving an additional or replacement lien in other property to the extent of any decrease in value of 
the original collateral. See 11 U.S.C. § 361(2) (2010). 
 6. See id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i). 
 7. Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 518 (1938) (emphasis added). The Court 
quoted from Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 470 (1937), referring 
to its holding in Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U.S. 225, 227 (1931): 
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Despite provisions of the Bankruptcy Code that alter secured 
creditors’ rights, the Code contains provisions designed to assure the 
adequate protection of the secured creditor’s interest in collateral 
consistent with the Fifth Amendment mandate. Indeed, the right to 
adequate protection of its lien is given a higher priority than the 
reorganization policy. For example, a secured creditor has an absolute 
right to relief from the automatic stay to foreclose on its collateral if the 
debtor fails to provide the secured creditor with adequate protection of 
its lien.8 Similarly, the continued use of the collateral by the debtor must 
be prohibited, conditioned, or modified to the extent that such use will 
deprive the lien holder of adequate protection.9 Thus, if collateral is 
depreciating, the automatic stay must be terminated or modified, or the 
debtor’s use of the collateral must be prohibited or limited, unless the 
trustee or debtor in possession makes periodic cash payments, grants a 
replacement lien, or provides some other means of assuring that the 
creditor will realize the “indubitable equivalent” of its lien.10 The Code 
requires the termination of the automatic stay to permit foreclosure by a 
secured creditor based on the lack of adequate protection, regardless of 
whether such relief will destroy any prospects for a successful 
reorganization of the debtor and the adverse consequences that may 
result from such termination.11 
Particular challenges in balancing the rights of lienors and the 
reorganization policy occur when creditors are undersecured because the 
value of collateral is less than the amount of the debt. In general, if the 
value of the collateral is less than the amount of the debt, under 
section 506(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, the creditor’s claim is treated 
as a secured claim up to the value of the collateral and as an unsecured 
claim for the deficiency.12 The secured claim has a higher priority in the 
distribution scheme in bankruptcy with respect to its collateral, while 
unsecured claims often realize only pennies on the dollar. 
In view of such bifurcation, a potential danger faced by secured 
creditors in chapter 11 cases is the risk that the collateral will be 
 
A court of bankruptcy may affect the interests of lien holders in many ways. To carry out 
the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, it may direct that all liens upon property forming a 
part of the bankrupt’s estate be marshalled; or that the property be sold free of 
encumbrances and the rights of all lien holders be transferred to the proceeds of the sale. 
Wright, 300 U.S. at 470. 
 8. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (requiring the bankruptcy court to grant a party’s request for relief from 
the automatic stay for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of the party’s property 
interest). 
 9. See id. § 363(e). 
 10. See id. § 361. 
 11. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 362.07[3][b] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th 
ed. 2010). 
 12. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2010). 
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undervalued, thus depriving the creditor of the full benefit of its lien. 
Such undervaluation could arise in a number of contexts. For example, if 
a secured creditor moves for relief from the automatic stay on the ground 
that its collateral is depreciating and is not adequately protected, the 
court could conduct a hearing and make a determination as to the value 
of the collateral. Much ink has been spilled over the proper way for 
courts to value collateral, but regardless of the methodology employed in 
a judicial valuation, such valuation is not an exact science and is subject 
to error.13 
The most accurate method for determining the value of collateral is 
to conduct a true market test in the form of a public auction with court-
approved bidding procedures designed to attract the highest and best 
offer. As the Supreme Court said in Bank of America National Trust & 
Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, “[u]nder a plan 
granting an exclusive right, making no provision for competing bids or 
competing plans, any determination that the price was top dollar would 
necessarily be made by a judge in bankruptcy court, whereas the best 
way to determine value is exposure to a market.”14 However, if the 
debtor desires to retain ownership of the collateral, a true market test 
through a public auction is not possible. Therefore, out of necessity, 
judicial valuation of property is a part of the chapter 11 process. 
The Bankruptcy Code includes certain provisions designed to 
protect secured lenders against a judicial undervaluation when the 
debtor will keep the collateral, either during the chapter 11 case or under 
a plan of reorganization. For example, section 507(b) gives the secured 
creditor a “superpriority” administrative expense claim (an administrative 
expense claim with priority over other administrative expense claims) to 
the extent that “adequate protection” granted to the creditor and 
approved by the court eventually falls short and proves to have been 
inadequate with the benefit of hindsight by the end of the case.15 
Another protection against judicial undervaluation of a secured 
creditor’s collateral in connection with a plan of reorganization is section 
1111(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, which generally permits the holder 
of a nonrecourse mortgage to assert an unsecured deficiency claim 
against the estate unless the debtor sells the collateral during the case or 
under a chapter 11 plan.16 The unsecured deficiency claim would not exist 
outside of bankruptcy or in a chapter 7 case because of the nonrecourse 
 
 13. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, 
and the Reorganization Bargain, 115 Yale L.J. 1930 (2006); Keith Sharfman, Judicial Valuation 
Behavior: Some Evidence from Bankruptcy, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 387 (2005). 
 14. 526 U.S. 434, 457 (1999). 
 15. 11 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2010). 
 16. Id. § 1111(b)(1). See 7 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1111.03 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. 
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2010). 
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nature of the debt, but is recognized in chapter 11.17 Although the 
creditor may be harmed by judicial undervaluation of the collateral, that 
harm may be mitigated to some extent by giving the creditor a 
distribution on a fictitious unsecured deficiency claim. 
Section 1111(b)(2) goes even further in protecting creditors against 
undervaluation of their collateral by allowing a class of undersecured 
creditors to elect to have their claims treated as fully secured claims in 
certain circumstances.18 The effect of such an election is that the total 
amount owed to a secured creditor in that class will not be subject to 
bifurcation into secured and unsecured deficiency claims under 
section 506(a). Such protection is not absolute and judicial valuation of 
collateral may be necessary; but if the debtor retains the collateral under 
a chapter 11 plan, in order to satisfy the requirements for confirmation 
under section 1129(b) the secured creditors in a section 1111(b)(2) 
electing class must receive under the plan deferred cash payments that, in 
the aggregate, equal at least the amount of the debt regardless of any 
judicial valuation.19 Such cash payments must also have a present value of 
at least the value of the collateral as determined by the court, unless the 
class votes to accept a plan with a different treatment.20 Thus, although 
the court values the collateral to determine whether the present value of 
the deferred cash payments is sufficient, the plan must provide that 
secured creditors will receive a cash stream that, in the aggregate, equals 
the full amount of their total claims. For example, if a secured creditor in 
a class that elects treatment under section 1111(b)(2) has a $1 million 
claim secured by collateral that the judge determines is worth only 
$200,000, and the plan is confirmed despite the secured creditor’s 
nonacceptance, the plan must provide for deferred cash payments that 
have a present value of at least $200,000 but which total at least $1 
million. However, the right to make an election under section 1111(b)(2) 
does not apply if the secured creditor has recourse against the debtor and 
the collateral is sold during the case or under a chapter 11 plan.21 Thus, 
the protection against judicial undervaluation in section 1111(b)(2) is 
designed primarily to protect secured creditors when property is retained 
by the debtor. When property is sold free and clear of a lien either during 
the case or under a plan, the secured creditor does not need the 
 
 17. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (2010); see also 7 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 16, 
¶ 1111.03[1][a][ii][B] (“If section 1111(b)(1) was not included in the Code and the creditor agreed not 
to assert a deficiency claim against the debtor personally . . . section 502(b)(1) would require the 
bankruptcy court to enforce the contract . . . and disallow a deficiency claim.”). 
 18. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(2). 
 19. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) (2010). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. § 1111(b)(1)(B). The right to make the election also does not apply if the lien is of 
inconsequential value. 
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protection of section 1111(b) because it should be protected from 
undervaluation by an auction process. 
Although an auction process should produce an accurate test of the 
collateral’s market value, the Bankruptcy Code does not assume that 
auctions are always going to provide secured creditors with true market 
value when collateral is to be sold. In particular, section 363(k) provides 
an important protection designed to assure that property is not sold by 
the bankruptcy estate outside of a chapter 11 plan at a price that is below 
true market value. Section 363(k) provides secured creditors with the 
right to bid when collateral is sold during the bankruptcy case and, if a 
secured creditor purchases the property, it may offset its secured claim 
against the purchase price instead of paying cash, unless the court orders 
otherwise for cause.22 This right is often referred to as the right to “credit 
bid.”23 Most significant, the secured creditor may credit bid up to its 
entire debt amount without being limited to a judicially determined 
valuation of the collateral.24 For example, if the debt is $100,000 and the 
highest cash bidder offers to purchase the collateral for $60,000, the 
secured creditor, believing that the collateral is worth more than $60,000, 
could submit a higher bid, say $70,000, without the need to provide any 
cash, thus assuring that the secured creditor will not have to accept the 
proceeds received at a faulty or inadequate auction. 
Another provision designed to protect a secured creditor against the 
risk of undervaluation as a result of an inadequate auction is section 
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), which has been construed by the clear weight of 
authority to give secured creditors the right to credit bid when collateral 
is sold free and clear of liens under a chapter 11 plan that was not 
supported by the secured creditor’s class.25 However, two recent court of 
appeals decisions—the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Philadelphia 
Newspapers, LLC and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in In re Pacific Lumber 
Co.—have undermined this protection by allowing courts to deprive a 
secured creditor of the right to credit bid at an auction of the collateral in 
a sale under a chapter 11 plan that the secured creditor’s class voted to 
reject, so long as the court finds that the plan affords the secured creditor 
the realization of the indubitable equivalent of its secured claim.26 
Although one of those decisions, Philadelphia Newspapers, recognizes the 
possibility that a public auction process could give the secured creditor 
 
 22. Id. § 363(k). 
 23. See, e.g., Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448, 
459–61 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See, e.g., River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank (In re River Road Hotel 
Partners, LLC), 651 F.3d 642, 647–48 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 26. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010); Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official 
Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009). 
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the indubitable equivalent of its claim despite the denial of the right to 
credit bid, the other decision, Pacific Lumber, went even further by 
upholding the confirmation of a plan involving the transfer of the 
collateral free and clear of liens and cash payment to the objecting 
secured creditor based solely on a judicial valuation of the collateral—
thus depriving the secured creditor of any market-test valuation by 
auction in a situation in which the collateral was transferred and not 
retained by the debtor.27 The court concluded that the plan afforded the 
creditor the indubitable equivalent of its secured claim.28 
This Article discusses the effects of these recent decisions on the 
risk of undervaluation of collateral faced by secured creditors when a 
chapter 11 plan provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of liens 
and deprives the secured creditor of the right to credit bid at the auction. 
Part I addresses the right of a secured creditor to credit bid when 
collateral is sold free and clear of liens during the bankruptcy case but 
not under a chapter 11 plan. Part II discusses generally the requirements 
for confirming a plan despite nonacceptance by a class of secured 
creditors and how such requirements affect the right to credit bid at a 
sale under a chapter 11 plan. Part III focuses on the recent decisions of 
the Third and Fifth Circuits that have upheld plan confirmations despite 
a denial of the right to credit bid. Part IV discusses a contrary decision of 
the Seventh Circuit upholding the right to credit bid at asset sales under 
chapter 11 plans, thereby creating a circuit split on these important 
issues. Part V discusses the ramifications of the recent decisions 
curtailing the right to credit bid. 
I.  The Right to Credit Bid at a Sale Under Section 363 of the 
Bankruptcy Code 
Section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that during a 
bankruptcy case, a trustee or debtor in possession may, after notice and a 
hearing, use, sell, or lease property of the estate outside the ordinary 
course of business.29 Section 363(f) provides that, under certain 
circumstances, such property may be sold to a third party free and clear 
of liens and other property interests.30 If a secured creditor’s collateral is 
sold free and clear of its lien, the lien attaches to the proceeds of the sale 
for the benefit of the secured creditor.31 
 
 27. See infra Part III for a discussion of these cases. 
 28. See In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 249 (“We conclude that the MRC/Marathon plan . . . did 
not violate the absolute priority rule, was fair and equitable, satisfies 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii), 
and yielded a fair value of the Noteholders’ secured claim.”). 
 29. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b). 
 30. Id. § 363(f). 
 31. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 11, ¶ 363.06 (“It has long been recognized that the 
bankruptcy court has the power to authorize the sale of property free of liens with the liens attaching 
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In order to protect the secured creditor from a sale process that may 
not produce the true market value of the collateral, section 363(k) 
provides: 
  At a sale under subsection (b) of this section of property that is 
subject to a lien that secures an allowed claim, unless the court for 
cause orders otherwise the holder of such claim may bid at such sale, 
and, if the holder of such claim purchases such property, such holder 
may offset such claim against the purchase price of such property.32 
Granting a secured creditor the right to credit bid when the debtor 
is seeking to sell the secured creditor’s collateral free and clear of liens, 
thus using an offset of its claim as currency for the purchase price, was 
not a new concept when the Bankruptcy Code was enacted. Credit 
bidding was recognized under common law.33 While the Uniform 
Commercial Code is silent on a secured creditor’s right to credit bid at a 
foreclosure of the secured creditor’s collateral, at least one bankruptcy 
court has found that a secured creditor’s right to credit bid is implicit in 
the authorization for the secured creditor to buy at a public sale.34 
Congress sought to statutorily protect this right by including 
section 363(k) in the Bankruptcy Code when it was enacted in 1978.35 
It is important to note that, as discussed above, the secured 
creditor’s right to credit bid is not limited to a previous valuation under 
section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.36 Therefore, the secured creditor 
can credit bid the face amount of its claim, regardless of whether a 
previous valuation provided the creditor with a claim bifurcated into 
both secured and unsecured claims. In essence, the secured creditor’s bid 
sets the value of the collateral.37 For example, suppose that a secured 
creditor gives the debtor a $10 million full recourse loan, which was 
secured by the debtor’s factory. At the time of the loan, the factory was 
worth $6 million. Assume that the lien on the factory was properly 
 
to the proceeds, with or without the consent of the lienholder.”). 
 32. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k). 
 33. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 11, ¶ 363.LH[1] (citing Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. 
Co., 304 U.S. 502 (1938); Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U.S. 225 (1931); Ray v. Norseworthy, 90 U.S. 
(23 Wall.) 128 (1874); Allebach v. Thomas (In re Nicholson), 16 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1927)). 
 34. In re Finova Capital Corp., 356 B.R. 609, 624–25 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (“Although [the UCC] 
falls short of granting secured creditors a right to credit bid, it does grant them a right to ‘buy’ without 
limiting the form of acceptable payment. Given that the [UCC] allows secured creditors to buy 
and . . . [the UCC does not] prohibit credit bidding, it would be overly-formalistic to prohibit credit 
bidding in this situation. As the proceeds of a sale under [the UCC] are used to pay the debt owed to 
the secured creditor, it is ultimately inconsequential whether a secured creditor pays with cash or with 
the reduction of debt. The end result is the same.”). 
 35. 124 Cong. Rec. S33,995 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini); 124 Cong. 
Rec. H32,396 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards). 
 36. Cohen v. KB Mezzanine Fund II, LP (In re SubMicron Sys. Corp.), 432 F.3d 448, 460–61 (3d 
Cir. 2006). 
 37. Id. (stating that one rationale behind the secured creditor’s right to credit bid is that “by 
definition [the bid itself] becomes the value of [the lender’s] security interest in [the collateral]”). 
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perfected and not subject to any infirmity. Subsequently, the debtor files 
for chapter 11 bankruptcy relief, at which time the principal balance due 
on the loan is still $10 million and the factory is worth $7 million 
according to a valuation provided by the bankruptcy court. Under 
section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the secured creditor has a 
secured claim for $7 million and an unsecured deficiency claim for $3 
million. If the debtor seeks to sell the factory during the bankruptcy case 
under section 363(b), the secured creditor would be protected by its right 
to credit bid up to the full amount of its claim, or $10 million, at a sale of 
the factory. By becoming the winning bidder, the secured creditor would 
buy the factory and, instead of paying any cash, its claim against the 
debtor would be reduced by the amount of the credit bid. In this 
scenario, the secured creditor would own the factory after the sale 
without the need to pay any cash, and would have an unsecured 
deficiency claim against the debtor’s bankruptcy estate for any difference 
between the amount of the credit bid and the amount of the debt. If the 
secured creditor bid the full $10 million, it would have no deficiency 
claim. The creditor, as purchaser, would be free to keep the property 
(hoping for price appreciation) or sell the property for a negotiated 
amount or by conducting its own auction. 
Presumably, a secured creditor will not credit bid unless it believes 
that all other bidders will bid amounts that are less than the actual 
market value of the collateral.38 The secured creditor would not want to 
submit a credit bid above the true value of the collateral because, to the 
extent that a credit bid exceeds the true value, the secured creditor 
forfeits an unsecured deficiency claim against the bankruptcy estate.39 If 
there will be no distribution to unsecured creditors, the loss of a 
deficiency claim will have no adverse consequence. However, even if a 
deficiency claim is worthless, the secured creditor ordinarily would not 
want to bid more than the actual value of the collateral because it would 
have to incur the costs of maintaining and reselling the collateral after 
the purchase. Of course, if a third-party bidder believes the secured 
creditor’s credit bid undervalues the collateral, it may bid a higher 
amount and prevail at the auction, in which case the secured creditor’s 
lien attaches to the proceeds of the sale.40 In that regard, the secured 
creditor may have the advantage of familiarity with the debtor’s business 
and greater information regarding the actual value of the assets.41 In any 
 
 38. Id. (stating that one rationale behind credit bidding is that a secured creditor would “not 
outbid [a] [b]idder unless [the] [l]ender believe[d] it could generate a greater return on [the collateral] 
than the return for [the] [l]ender represented by [the] [b]idder’s offer”). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Vincent S. J. Buccola & Ashley C. Keller, Credit Bidding and the Design of Bankruptcy 
Auctions, 18 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 99, 120 (2010) (“As a secured party, the creditor wishing to credit 
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event, the credit bidder has the distinct advantage in the auction process 
because it need not use its cash or otherwise seek alternative financing to 
make the purchase. 
Section 363(k) was amended in 1984 to give bankruptcy courts the 
discretion to preclude a secured creditor from credit bidding “for cause.”42 
However, because the Bankruptcy Code does not define “cause,” courts 
have discretion to determine the circumstances that justify denial of such 
right.43 In general, a court may deny the right to credit bid if such denial 
is in the interest of furthering a policy advanced by the Bankruptcy 
Code, such as when credit bidding would chill the bidding process or 
would otherwise hinder the reorganization process.44 In particular, 
bankruptcy courts have denied the right to credit bid for cause where the 
court has found that (1) the debtor failed to notify other interested 
parties (especially other secured creditors) of the asset sale, (2) the sale 
to the credit bidder would be for an inadequate sale price, (3) there was a 
bona fide dispute regarding the validity of the secured creditor’s lien, and 
(4) the sale would be delayed and the value of property would be 
diminished due to questions regarding the status of a creditor’s lien.45 
Despite the court’s discretion to deny the right to credit bid under 
section 363(k), the presumption is that the right applies and the burden 
to prove cause for the denial of such right is on the debtor or any other 
party in interest who seeks to prevent the secured creditor from credit 
bidding.46 
 
bid is likely more familiar with the debtor’s business and assets than are other prospective buyers. 
Through its history of monitoring the debtor, the credit bidder may be privy to information about the 
true value of the collateral the debtor is selling that is not apparent to other would-be bidders.”). 
 42. See In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 315 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 43. Id. at 315–16. 
 44. Id. at 316 n.14 (“A court may deny a lender the right to credit bid in the interest of any policy 
advanced by the Code, such as to ensure the success of the reorganization or to foster a competitive 
bidding environment.” (citing 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 11, ¶ 363.09[1])). 
 45. See, e.g., In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC, No. 09 B 30029, 2010 WL 6634603, at *2 
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2010) (“[C]ourts have required secured creditors to put cash in escrow, pay a 
portion of the bid in cash, or furnish a letter of credit when the amount and validity of an alleged 
senior lien is in dispute.”); In re Takeout Taxi Holdings, Inc., 307 B.R. 525, 534 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2004) 
(holding that there was sufficient “cause” to deny credit bidding because four of the secured creditors 
were not served with the sale motion and two did not receive a copy of the notice of the proposed 
sale); In re Theroux, 169 B.R. 498, 499 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1994) (holding that “cause” exists where the 
“intended selling price is only a fraction of the fair market value” and “the sale, as proposed, [would] 
benefit only the secured creditor, while inflicting [significant] financial damage upon the taxing 
authorities”); In re Diebart Bancroft, Nos. 92-3744, 92-3745, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 836, at *15 (E.D. 
La. Jan. 25, 1993) (regarding cause to deny the right to credit bid, the court held that “there was cause 
shown: namely, the need for cash in escrow to satisfy the lien dispute”). 
 46. See In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 332–33 n.18. 
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II.  Credit Bidding at an Asset Sale Under a Chapter 11 Plan 
In contrast to a section 363 asset sale during a bankruptcy case, 
assets may also be sold under a chapter 11 plan. Section 1123(a)(5) of the 
Bankruptcy Code requires that every plan provide for adequate means 
for the plan’s implementation, such as, among other possible actions, the 
“sale of all or any part of the property of the estate, either subject to or 
free of any lien.”47 Moreover, section 1123(b), which sets forth optional 
plan provisions, states that a plan may “provide for the sale of all or 
substantially all of the property of the estate.”48 
A chapter 11 plan must be confirmed by the court for it to become 
effective and binding on the parties, and section 1129 of the Bankruptcy 
Code sets forth the requirements for confirmation.49 In most cases, the 
debtor will seek the acceptance of the plan from all classes of claims and 
equity interests that are impaired by the plan.50 If all impaired classes 
accept the plan and a number of other requirements listed in section 
1129(a) are satisfied, the plan may be confirmed.51 However, if an 
impaired class does not accept the plan, it may be confirmed nonetheless, 
or “crammed down” the rejecting class, if certain requirements specified 
in section 1129(b) have been met.52 Most significantly, a plan may be 
crammed down a rejecting class only if the plan does not discriminate 
unfairly and is “fair and equitable” with respect to that class.53 If the 
rejecting class consists of secured claims, section 1129(b)(2)(A) provides 
that it would not be fair and equitable, and thus cannot be confirmed, 
unless the plan provides for at least one of the following alternative 
treatments of the secured claims in that class: (1) the secured creditors, 
among other things, retain their liens on the collateral and receive 
deferred cash payments; (2) the collateral is sold free and clear of the 
liens, subject to the right to credit bid; or (3) the secured creditors realize 
the “indubitable equivalent” of their secured claims.54 In particular, 
section 1129(b)(2)(A) provides that the following treatment must be 
afforded the nonaccepting class of secured claims for the plan to satisfy 
the fair and equitable requirement: 
 
 47. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(D) (2010). 
 48. Id. § 1123(b)(4). The sale of all—or substantially all—of the debtor’s assets in a chapter 11 
case has become common in recent years. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 
at Twilight, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 673, 675 (2003); see also Buccola & Keller, supra note 41, at 99 (“In high-
stakes cases, bankruptcy judges now serve primarily as auctioneers.”). 
 49. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129, 1141(a) (2010). 
 50. See id. § 1124 (regarding impairment of claims); id. § 1126 (regarding acceptance of a chapter 
11 plan). 
 51. See id. § 1129 (regarding the requirements for a chapter 11 plan confirmation); see also 
7 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 16, ch. 1129.  
 52. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1). 
 53. Id. § 1129(b). 
 54. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A). 
Resnick_63-HLJ-323 (Do Not Delete) 1/24/2012 6:05 PM 
January 2012] THE RIGHT TO CREDIT BID 335 
  (i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the liens securing such 
claims, whether the property subject to such liens is retained by the 
debtor or transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed 
amount of such claims; and 
  (II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of 
such claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount 
of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least 
the value of such holder’s interest in the estate’s interest in such 
property; 
  (ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property 
that is subject to the liens securing such claims, free and clear of such 
liens, with such liens to attach to the proceeds of such sale, and the 
treatment of such liens on proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this 
subparagraph; or 
  (iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent 
of such claims.55 
Until recently, the majority view among commentators and courts 
was that if a chapter 11 plan provides for the sale of collateral free and 
clear of liens, the second alternative as set forth in section 
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) must be satisfied, thus affording a nonaccepting secured 
creditor class the right to credit bid at the sale, rather than providing them 
with an alternative treatment under section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii), which is 
the indubitable equivalent of their secured claims.56 That is, a plan calling 
for the sale of collateral free and clear of liens over the objection of the 
secured creditor class must provide the same right to credit bid as the 
creditor would have in a sale under section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy 
Code. By affording the secured creditor the right to credit bid in a sale 
under a plan, the creditor is protected against the undervaluation of its 
collateral resulting from a defective auction that fails to obtain the true 
market value of the property or from a judicial valuation in lieu of an 
auction. 
III.  Two Recent Decisions Denying Secured Creditors the 
Right to Credit Bid at Plan Sales 
In surprising recent decisions, two courts of appeals have held that a 
plan that provides for the sale of collateral free and clear of liens may be 
fair and equitable, and thus may be crammed down a class of secured 
claims, despite the fact that the plan deprives an objecting secured 
creditor of the right to credit bid up to the face amount of its claim.57 
Both appellate courts held that a bankruptcy court may use its discretion 
to approve a sale of assets pursuant to a cram-down plan, even if the 
 
 55. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iii). 
 56. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 319 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
 57. See generally In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298; Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official 
Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009). 
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secured creditor has been denied the right to credit bid, if the court 
determines that the affected secured creditor will realize the indubitable 
equivalent of its claim under section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii).58 These courts 
found subsections (i) through (iii) of section 1129(b)(2)(A) to be clear 
and unambiguous in providing three separate alternatives and, therefore, 
they did not give significant weight to the policy or legislative history 
behind the enactment of these and other related sections in the Code.59 
A. IN RE PACIFIC LUMBER CO. 
In Pacific Lumber, six affiliated entities involved in growing, 
harvesting, and processing redwood timber in Humboldt County, 
California, filed separate chapter 11 petitions in the bankruptcy court for 
the Southern District of Texas in 2007.60 The six cases were jointly 
administered by the bankruptcy court.61 The principal debtors were 
Pacific Lumber Company, referred to in the case as “Palco,” and Scotia 
Pacific LLC, referred to as “Scopac.”62 Palco owned and operated a 
sawmill and a power plant in the town of Scotia, California.63 Palco also 
owned Scopac, which was a Delaware special purpose entity.64 In 1998, 
Palco transferred ownership of more than 200,000 acres of redwood 
timberland, referred to in the case as the “Timberlands,” to Scopac to 
enable Scopac to issue approximately $867 million in notes secured by 
the Timberlands and certain other assets owned by Scopac.65 The Bank of 
New York Trust Co., in its capacity as indenture trustee with respect to 
the notes, represented the noteholders in the bankruptcy case.66 When 
the bankruptcy cases commenced, Scopac owed the noteholders 
approximately $740 million in principal and accrued interest on the 
notes.67 Scopac also owed approximately $36 million to Bank of America 
on a secured line of credit with a right to payment that was senior in 
priority to the noteholders.68 Marathon Structured Finance held a 
secured claim against Palco’s assets, which approximated $160 million, 
 
 58. See cases cited supra note 57. 
 59. See cases cited supra note 57. 
 60. 584 F.3d at 236. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 236 & n.2. The four additional debtors included: (i) Britt Lumber Company, Inc., a 
manufacturer of fencing and decking products; (ii) Scotia Inn, Inc., operator of the inn in Scotia, 
California; (iii) Salmon Creek, LLC, a holding company owning roughly 1,300 acres of timberland; and 
(iv) Scotia Development Corp., LLC, a development corporation for exploring and facilitating 
development opportunities in commercial, industrial, and residential properties in California and 
Texas. These four entities and Scopac are all wholly owned by Palco. 
 63. Id. at 236. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 236–37. 
 67. Id. at 237. 
 68. Id. 
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including amounts relating to financing extended before and after the 
bankruptcy case commenced.69 Marathon estimated that Palco’s assets 
were worth approximately $110 million on the date of the bankruptcy 
filings.70 
Marathon and Mendocino Redwood Company (“MRC”), a 
competitor of Palco, teamed up and sought to play a significant role in 
the reorganization of the debtors, including making a major cash 
investment in the companies.71 Together, they proposed a chapter 11 plan 
that provided for the dissolution of all six debtor entities, cancellation of 
all intercompany debt owed between the debtors, and the creation of two 
new entities, Townco and Newco.72 Substantially all of Palco’s assets 
would be transferred to Townco.73 The Timberlands and the assets of the 
sawmill would be placed in Newco.74 MRC and Marathon proposed to 
contribute approximately $580 million to Newco so that the money could 
be used to pay claims against Scopac.75 In addition, Marathon would seek 
to convert to equity its senior secured claim against Palco’s assets, 
thereby giving Marathon full ownership of Townco, a 15% ownership 
interest in Newco, and a new promissory note in the amount of the 
sawmill’s working capital.76 MRC would own the other 85% of Newco’s 
equity and would manage the reorganized company.77 
The plan provided that Marathon and MRC would fund the plan 
with $580 million and that the noteholders would be paid the value of 
their collateral in cash and would receive a lien on the proceeds from 
pending unrelated litigation against the State of California.78 The 
noteholders’ claims were bifurcated into a secured claim for the value of 
the collateral and an unsecured claim for the amount of the unsecured 
deficiency.79 The value of the collateral was determined by the 
bankruptcy court at a valuation hearing at which it received extensive 
testimony on valuation.80 Based on the testimony, the bankruptcy court 
valued the Timberlands collateral at “not more than $510 million” and 
held that a $510 million cash payment was the indubitable equivalent of 
the noteholders’ secured claim with respect to the Timberlands collateral.81 
 
 69. Id. at 236. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 237. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 239. 
 79. Id. at 238. The noteholders did not elect to have the entire amount of their claims treated as 
secured claims under section 1111(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  
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The bankruptcy court also valued the noteholders’ liens on non-
Timberlands collateral, after deducting more senior liens, at $3.6 
million.82 Accordingly, the plan proposed to pay $513.6 million to the 
noteholders in cash in full satisfaction of their secured claims.83 Yet the 
total amount owed to the noteholders on their secured notes was 
approximately $740 million.84 
The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan despite its rejection by the 
class of noteholders, finding that the plan was fair and equitable under 
section 1129(b)(2)(A) with respect to the noteholders’ secured claims.85 
Though the noteholders argued that the plan was not fair and equitable 
as to them because the reorganization constituted a sale without 
affording the noteholders the right to credit bid under subsection 
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), the bankruptcy court held that the plan transactions 
constituted a “transfer” rather than a “sale” of assets, so that subsection 
1129(b)(2)(A)(iii), rather than subsection (ii), was applicable.86 The 
noteholders appealed the bankruptcy court’s order confirming the plan, 
making several arguments including that the plan constituted a sale of 
the Timberlands to Newco and that, under subsection (ii), the 
noteholders should have been afforded an opportunity to credit bid at 
the sale of the Timberlands up to $740 million, which was the face 
amount of their claims.87 The noteholders argued that allowing them to 
credit bid would demonstrate that the court’s valuation of the 
Timberlands at $510 million was inaccurate and undervalued.88 The 
noteholders requested a direct appeal to the court of appeals rather than 
going through the traditional appeal to the district court or bankruptcy 
appellate panel, and the Fifth Circuit granted the request.89 The court of 
appeals disagreed with the bankruptcy court’s finding that the plan 
transaction did not constitute a “sale” of assets:90  
MRC, a competitor of Palco, joined with Palco’s creditor Marathon to 
offer cash and convert debt into equity in return for taking over both 
Palco and Scopac. New entities wholly owned by MRC and Marathon 
received title to the assets in exchange for this purchase. That the 
transaction is complex does not fundamentally alter that it involved a 
“sale” of the Noteholders’ collateral.91  
 
 82. Id. at 239. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 237. 
 85. Id. at 238–39. 
 86. Id. at 245. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 239. 
 89. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2010) (regarding appeals of bankruptcy court orders directly to the 
court of appeals). 
 90. In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 245.  
 91. Id. 
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Since a sale occurred, the appellate court found that subsection 
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) “could have applied.”92 
However, the Fifth Circuit rejected the noteholders’ argument that, 
because the transaction constituted a sale of its collateral, subsection (ii) 
of section 1129(b)(2)(A) must apply so as to give the noteholders the 
right to credit bid for the Timberlands:93 “This court has subscribed to the 
obvious proposition that because the three subsections of [section] 
1129(b)(2)(A) are joined by the disjunctive ‘or,’ they are alternatives.”94 
Thus, the court held that subsection (iii) affords a distinct basis for 
confirming the plan, without a credit-bidding opportunity, so long as the 
plan offers the noteholders the indubitable equivalent of their secured 
claims.95 The court recognized that subsection (ii), with credit-bid 
protection, might be imperative in some cases, but not in Pacific Lumber 
because the cash payment to the noteholders offered a distinct basis for 
finding that the plan offered the noteholders the indubitable equivalent 
of their secured claims.96 
Having held that a debtor may cram down a sale plan on a class of 
secured creditors pursuant to subsection (iii) of section 1129(b)(2)(A), 
which does not provide the class of secured creditors with the right to 
credit bid the face amount of their claims, the court then addressed the 
question of whether the plan provided the noteholders with the 
indubitable equivalent of their claims.97 The court first noted that 
subsection (iii) is satisfied if, with respect to a class of secured claims, the 
plan provides “for the realization by such holders of the indubitable 
equivalent of such claims.”98 The term “such claims” refers to the 
noteholders’ allowed secured claims which, by reason of section 506(a), 
do not exceed the value of the collateral securing their claims. 
Recognizing that there are few judicial decisions explaining what 
treatment constitutes the indubitable equivalent of a secured claim 
because most cram-down plans satisfy either subsection (i) or (ii) of 
section 1129(b)(2)(A), the court gave two examples of when 
subsection (iii) would be satisfied: abandoning collateral to the secured 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. (citing Heartland Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Briscoe Enters., Ltd., II (In re Briscoe Enters., 
Ltd., II), 994 F.2d 1160, 1168 (5th Cir. 1993)). The court also noted that the three alternatives set forth 
in section 1129(b)(2)(A) are not even exhaustive because the introductory phrase of section 
1129(b)(2) states that the “condition that a plan be fair and equitable includes the following 
requirements.” Id. (emphasis added). Section 102(3) of the Bankruptcy Code states that the word 
“includes” is not limiting, so that a plan that complies with one of the three stated alternatives does 
not assure that the court will find the plan fair and equitable. 
 95. Id. at 246. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2010) (emphasis added). 
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creditors or granting them a replacement lien on similar collateral.99 In 
contrast, issuing unsecured notes or equity securities to the secured 
creditors or giving them cash that is less than the amount of their allowed 
secured claims would fall short of satisfying the “indubitable equivalent” 
standard,100 as would offering them a balloon payment for the full amount 
of their secured claim ten years after plan confirmation, together with 
interim interest payments but no requirement to protect the collateral.101 
The court, after considering these examples, focused on “what is 
really at stake in secured credit—repayment of principal and the time 
value of money”—and concluded that “[w]hatever uncertainties exist 
about indubitable equivalent, paying off secured creditors in cash can 
hardly be improper if the plan accurately reflected the value of the 
Noteholders’ collateral.”102 But how can the appellate court know that 
the bankruptcy court accurately valued the collateral if there was no 
market test by auction at which the noteholders had a right to credit bid? 
In fact, in Pacific Lumber there was no auction at all. Despite its 
recognition that the Supreme Court in Bank of America National Trust 
& Savings Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership “encourages 
bankruptcy courts to be wary of the shortcomings of judicial valuation 
proceedings,”103 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s 
confirmation order, concluding that the bankruptcy court’s judicial 
determination of the collateral’s value, arrived at after an extensive 
contested hearing at which eight valuation experts had testified, “is not 
clearly wrong.”104 
Most significantly, the Fifth Circuit upheld a cram-down confirmation 
against a rejecting class of secured creditors by paying them cash that was 
less than the total amount of the debt owed to them but that was 
judicially determined to equal the value of their collateral.105 Because the 
 
 99. In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 246. The court cited Sandy Ridge Development Corp. v. 
Louisiana National Bank (In re Sandy Ridge Development Corp.), 881 F.2d 1346, 1352 (5th Cir. 1989), 
holding that a plan that provided for the return of collateral in satisfaction of the secured creditor’s 
claim, which became known as a “dirt for debt” plan, could satisfy the “indubitable equivalent” 
standard. The court also cited Brite v. Sun Country Development, Inc. (In re Sun Country 
Development, Inc.), 764 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1985), and Kenneth N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know 
About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 Am. Bankr. L.J. 133, 156 (1979). 
 100. In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 246.  
 101. Id. The court cited In re Murel Holding Co., 75 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1935), where Judge 
Learned Hand first used the term “indubitable equivalent.” 
 102. In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 246–47. The Fifth Circuit rejected the noteholders’ argument 
that depriving them of the right to credit bid and purchase the property deprived them of the 
indubitable equivalent of their secured claims because it resulted in the forfeiture of the possibility of 
future increases in the collateral’s value: “The Bankruptcy Code, however, does not protect a secured 
creditor’s upside potential; it protects the ‘allowed secured claim.’” Id. at 247. 
 103. Id. at 247 (citing Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. 203 North LaSalle St. P’ship, 526 
U.S. 434 (1999)). 
 104. Id. at 248. 
 105. Id. at 249. 
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appellate court concluded that the plan involved a “sale” of the 
collateral, and an election to be treated as fully secured under section 
1111(b)(2) is not available to the holders of recourse claims when 
collateral is sold under a plan,106 the noteholders would not have had the 
right to make such an election. Also, the Fifth Circuit held that the 
noteholders did not have the right to credit bid for their collateral.107 
Therefore, the court held that secured creditors can be deprived of both 
the right to make a section 1111(b)(2) election and the right to credit bid 
for its collateral—the two primary protections against undervaluation of 
collateral—with respect to a cram-down confirmation, as long as the 
court is satisfied that its judicial valuation would enable the secured 
creditor to realize the indubitable equivalent of its secured claim. 
B. IN RE PHILADELPHIA NEWSPAPERS, LLC 
In February 2009, Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, and several 
affiliates including PMH Holdings, LLC, the parent company of all the 
debtors, filed chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.108 The debtors owned and operated print newspapers, 
including the Philadelphia Inquirer, the Philadelphia Daily News, and the 
online publication philly.com, all of which they purchased in 2006 as part 
of an acquisition of the businesses by a group of mainly Philadelphia-
based investors. The investor group formed Philadelphia Media 
Holdings, LLC (“PMH”), which entered into an asset purchase 
agreement to buy the print newspapers, the online publication, and the 
related businesses for a sale price of $515 million.109 After the acquisition, 
the individual who led the investor group assumed the role of the 
debtors’ chief executive officer and held 6.67% of the equity of the 
debtors.110 Subsequently, PMH became one of the debtors in the chapter 
11 cases.111 
In order to finance the 2006 acquisition, PMH borrowed 
approximately $295 million from a group of lenders, with Citizens Bank 
of Pennsylvania acting as administrative and collateral agent for the 
lenders.112 As part of the loan transaction, the lenders were given a 
security interest in substantially all of the debtors’ assets.113 
 
 106. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2010). 
 107. In re Pac. Lumber, 584 F.3d at 245. 
 108. The cases were jointly administered by the bankruptcy court. See In re Phila. Newspapers, 
LLC, 599 F. 3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 109. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 418 B.R. 548, 553 (E.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
 110. Id. 
 111. In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 301. 
 112. In re Phila. Newspapers, 418 B.R. at 553. 
 113. Id. 
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On August 20, 2009, the debtors filed a plan of reorganization that 
provided for the sale at public auction of substantially all of the debtors’ 
assets free and clear of the lenders’ security interest.114 At the same time, 
the debtors signed an asset purchase agreement with a “stalking-horse” 
bidder, Philly Papers, LLC.115 The asset purchase agreement, which was 
subject to bankruptcy court approval, gave Philly Papers the right to buy 
the assets only if a higher and better offer were not made at the 
auction.116 Philly Papers is comprised of several equity investors that had 
a relationship with the debtors, including Carpenters Pension and 
Annuity Fund of Philadelphia and Vicinity, which held a 30% equity 
interest in PMH.117 In addition, the person who was chairman and an 
equity owner of Philly Papers owned approximately 20% of the equity in 
PMH prior to the bankruptcy case.118 
The debtors’ chapter 11 plan provided for a cash distribution of 
approximately $37 million to the secured lenders, which is the amount 
that would have been generated from the sale of assets to Philly Papers, 
assuming that there were no higher and better bids.119 Under the plan, the 
secured lenders would also receive the debtors’ Philadelphia headquarters, 
valued at $29.5 million, subject to a two-year rent-free lease for the entity 
that would operate the newspapers. The total recovery to the secured 
creditors under the plan was approximately $66 million in total value, far 
less than the more than $300 million that was owed to the lenders at that 
time.120 The secured lenders also would receive any additional cash 
generated by a higher bid at the public auction.121 
On August 28, 2009, the debtors filed a motion to approve bidding 
procedures for the public auction, which required that any qualified 
bidder fund its purchase in cash and expressly precluded the secured 
lenders from credit bidding for the assets.122 In particular, the proposed 
bidding procedures included the following statement: 
  The Plan sale is being conducted under section[s] 1123(a) and (b) 
[and 1129] of the Bankruptcy Code, and not section 363 of the 
Bankruptcy Code. As such, no holder of a lien on any asset of the 
Debtors shall be permitted to credit bid pursuant to section 363(k) of 
the Bankruptcy Code.123 
 
 114. Id. at 553–54. 
 115. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 301 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 116. Id. at 302. 
 117. In re Phila. Newspapers, 418 B.R. at 554. 
 118. Id. Penn Matrix Investors, the third entity investor in Philly Papers, LLC, did not have an 
equity interest in PMH Holdings, LLC, and did not have any prior affiliation with the debtors before 
the consummation of the asset purchase agreement. Id. 
 119. In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 302. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. (citation omitted). 
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The secured lenders, as well as the U.S. trustee and other parties, 
filed objections to the bidding-procedures motion.124 The lenders argued 
that they had a right to credit bid for their collateral.125 In response, the 
debtors argued that denying the secured creditors the right to credit bid 
would create a more competitive bidding auction.126 The debtors asserted 
that they had engaged in extensive nationwide marketing to ensure that 
the results of the auction provided the best possible purchase price for 
the sale of the debtors’ assets.127 However, the committee of unsecured 
creditors filed a separate motion challenging that statement and seeking 
an order directing the debtors to cease a publicity campaign using the 
mantra “Keep It Local” on the grounds that the campaign was intended 
to suppress competitive bidding by dissuading out-of-town bidders from 
purchasing a local Philadelphia newspaper business, thus skewing the 
auction in favor of Philly Papers.128 
The bankruptcy court denied the debtors’ motion seeking approval 
of the bidding procedures that would ban the secured lenders from credit 
bidding at the asset sale.129 In denying the motion, the bankruptcy court 
noted that, until the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Pacific Lumber, the “clear 
weight of authority supported the [secured lenders’] position on the 
issue,”130 and that the Fifth Circuit itself acknowledged that “[t]he nature 
of this cramdown and the refusal to apply [section] 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) to 
authorize a credit bid are unusual, perhaps unprecedented decisions.”131 
The bankruptcy court agreed with the secured lenders’ argument 
that section 1129(b)(2)(A) should be read in tandem with sections 363(k) 
and 1111(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.132 The bankruptcy court determined 
that, from a review of the legislative intent regarding sections 363(k), 
1111(b), and 1129(b)(2)(A), the sale of the collateral by the debtors 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 418 B.R. 548, 569 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009). 
 126. Id. at 555. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 555 n.10. 
 129. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, No. 09-11204SR, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3167, at *26 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. Oct. 8, 2009), rev’d, 418 B.R. 548 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
 130. Id. at *17–18 (citing In re Matrix Dev. Corp., No. 08-32798-tmb11, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 1972, 
at *8 (Bankr. D. Or. July 16, 2009); In re SunCruz Casinos, LLC, 298 B.R. 833, 839 (Bankr. S.D. FIa. 
2003); In re River Vill. Assocs., 181 B.R. 795, 805 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); In re Kent Terminal Corp., 
166 B.R. 555, 566–67 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994); In re Orfa Corp. of Phila., Nos. 90-11253S, 90-11254S, 
90-11255S, 1991 Bankr. LEXIS 1952, at *17–20 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 1991); In re 222 Liberty 
Assocs., 108 B.R. 971, 978 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990); H & M Parmely Farms v. Farmers Home Admin., 
127 B.R. 644, 648 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1990); In re Realty Inv., Ltd. V, 72 B.R. 143, 146 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
1987)). 
 131. Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 
F.3d 229, 243 (5th Cir. 2009); In re Phila. Newspapers, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3167, at *25. 
 132. In re Phila. Newspapers, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3167, at *18–19 (“[T]he Criimi Mae Court did 
not consider the interplay between Code section 363(k), 1111(b) and 1129 [of the Bankruptcy 
Code] . . . .”). 
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required that the secured creditors have the right to credit bid the face 
amount of their claims at the auction.133 The bankruptcy court also noted 
that while the proposed plan proceeded under subsection (iii), the 
“indubitable equivalent” subsection of section 1129(b)(2)(A), it was 
structured as a subsection (ii) sale in every respect other than the right to 
credit bid.134 
According to the bankruptcy court, if a debtor may satisfy 
subsection (iii) through a public auction without affording the secured 
creditor the right to credit bid, it would be illogical for Congress to enact 
the statute to provide for subsection (ii) as an alternative to subsection 
(iii).135 Effectively, subsection (iii) would render subsection (ii) 
superfluous.136 Accordingly, the bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the 
secured creditors and denied the debtors’ bidding procedures motion.137 
The district court reversed the decision of the bankruptcy court, 
holding that the plain language of section 1129(b)(2)(A) does not 
provide that secured creditors are entitled to credit bid at a cram-down 
plan sale.138 Similar to the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Pacific Lumber, the 
district court focused on the plain language of subsections (i) through 
(iii) and reasoned that the three routes to plan confirmation under a 
cram-down plan sale are independent avenues separated by the 
disjunctive “or,” therefore rendering each prong independently sufficient 
for confirmation of a plan as “fair and equitable.”139 The district court 
relied on the fact that the right to credit bid was not incorporated into 
subsection (iii) by Congress and viewed the use of the “indubitable 
equivalent” standard as an “invitation to debtors to craft an appropriate 
treatment of a secured creditor’s claim, separate and apart from the 
provisions of subsection (ii).”140 
The secured creditors appealed the district court decision to the 
Third Circuit and, pending resolution of the appeal, the court stayed the 
auction.141 In affirming the district court’s order,142 the Third Circuit 
 
 133. Id. at *20–21 (citing 124 Cong. Rec. S17420 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. 
DeConcini); 124 Cong. Rec. HU, 104 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards)). 
 134. Id. at *19–20. 
 135. Id. at *14 (“[T]he Court disagrees with the proposition that, although § 1129(b)(2)(A) 
specifies three alternative means by way of which a reorganization plan may be confirmed, the last of 
these three (indubitable equivalence) may be employed when the exact means by which the plan 
intends the indubitable equivalent cramdown of a dissenting secured creditor is a cash out of the 
creditor via an auction sale such as is provided for in detail under the second of the three described 
alternatives.”). 
 136. Id. at *14–15. 
 137. Id. at *30–31. 
 138. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 418 B.R. 548, 552, 567 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009). 
 139. Id. at 567 (“The use of the connector ‘or’ in section 1129(b)(2)(A) supports the conclusion 
that the three alternatives are to be applied in the disjunctive.”). 
 140. Id. at 568. 
 141. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 303 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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found no statutory basis to conclude that subsection (ii) is the sole 
provision under which a debtor may seek to confirm a cram-down plan 
sale under section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, reasoning, as 
did the district court, that section 1129(b)(2)(A) is phrased in the 
disjunctive and the use of the word “or” in the statute operates to 
provide alternative means for a debtor to provide the secured creditor 
“fair and equitable” treatment.143 The Third Circuit found the language 
of section 1129(b)(2)(A) unambiguous and, based upon the plain 
meaning of the statute and recent precedent, namely the holding in 
Pacific Lumber, affirmed the decision of the district court and concluded 
that section 1129(b)(2)(A) provides that a cram-down plan sale can be 
confirmed as “fair and equitable” under the “indubitable equivalent” 
standard pursuant to subsection (iii), rather than by providing the 
secured creditor the right to credit bid under subsection (ii).144 
It is important to emphasize that the Third Circuit did not find that, 
under the particular facts of the case, a public auction without the right 
to credit bid will result in the secured lenders receiving the indubitable 
equivalent of their secured claims. It did not go that far in its holding. 
Indeed, the court cautioned that “our holding here only precludes a 
lender from asserting that it has an absolute right to credit bid when its 
collateral is being sold pursuant to a plan of reorganization”:145  
Both the District Court below and the Fifth Circuit in Pacific Lumber 
contemplated that, in some instances, credit bidding may be 
required . . . . [A] lender can still object to plan confirmation on a 
variety of bases, including that the absence of a credit bid did not 
provide it with the “indubitable equivalent” of its collateral.146 
Judge Thomas L. Ambro, in his dissenting opinion, disagreed with 
the majority’s view that the language of section 1129(b)(2)(A) is 
unambiguous:  
I cannot agree that the plain language of § 1129(b)(2)(A) is 
unambiguous and compels the sole interpretive conclusion they see as 
the plain meaning of the words. There is more than one reasonable 
reading of the statute, and thus we cannot simply look to its text alone 
in determining what Congress meant in enacting it.147  
 
 142. Id. at 304. 
 143. Id. at 305 (“The use of the word ‘or’ in [section 1129(b)(2)(A)] operates to provide 
alternatives—a debtor may proceed under subsection (i), (ii), or (iii), and need not satisfy more than 
one subsection.”). 
 144. Id. at 313–14. 
 145. Id. at 317. 
 146. Id. at 317–18. 
 147. Id at 319 (Ambro, J., dissenting). Disagreement over the plain meaning of section 
1129(b)(2)(A) “indicates that the provision is ambiguous when read in isolation and does not have a 
single plain meaning.” Id. at 322. “[B]oth the District Court and the Bankruptcy Court read [section 
1129(b)(2)(A)] in a plausible fashion, yet came to the opposite conclusions. Reasonable minds can 
differ on the interpretation of § 1129(b)(2)(A) as it applies to plan sales free of liens.” Id. 
Resnick_63-HLJ-323 (Do Not Delete) 1/24/2012 6:05 PM 
346 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:323 
Based on his review of established canons of statutory interpretation, 
the entire Bankruptcy Code, and the Code’s legislative history, Judge 
Ambro concluded that a plan providing for the sale of collateral free and 
clear of liens may be crammed down a nonaccepting class of secured 
creditors only if the secured creditors are provided the right to credit bid 
the face amount of their claims under subsection 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii).148 
Judge Ambro views subsections (i) through (iii) as three distinct 
ways in which a debtor can seek confirmation of a plan that is rejected by 
a class of secured creditors, but the application of each subsection 
depends on how the plan proposes to treat the claims of the secured 
creditors.149 That is, subsection (i) applies where secured creditors retain 
their liens securing their claims, and subsection (ii) applies where the 
plan provides for a sale free and clear of liens.150 Last, subsection (iii) can 
be viewed as a catch-all provision for the protection of secured creditors 
only when subsections (i) and (ii) are not clearly applicable.151 
To arrive at that proper reading of section 1129(b)(2)(A), Judge 
Ambro wrote that it is necessary to look beyond plain meaning and to 
analyze that section in conjunction with the Bankruptcy Code as a 
whole.152 Three related provisions in the Bankruptcy Code, sections 
1123(a)(5)(D), 363(k), and 1111(b), when taken together, “are integrated 
parts of congressional policy pertaining to secured creditors’ rights when 
their collateral is sold.”153 In particular, the dissent viewed sections 
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) and 1111(b) as alternative protections for the secured 
creditor, one to apply at a sale free and clear of liens and the latter to 
apply when the secured creditor’s collateral is retained by the debtor.154 
When these provisions are viewed in conjunction, they are “part of a 
comprehensive arrangement enacted by Congress to avoid the pitfalls of 
undervaluation . . . and thereby ensure that the rights of secured 
creditors are protected while maximizing the value of the collateral to the 
 
 148. Id. at 338. 
 149. Id. at 325 (“Congress did not list the three alternatives as routes to cramdown confirmation 
that were universally applicable to any plan, but instead as distinct routes that apply specific 
requirements depending on how a given plan proposes to treat the claims of secured creditors.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 326 (citing CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. United Chem. Techs., Inc., 202 B.R. 33, 49–51 
(E.D. Pa. 1996)). In CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. United Chem. Techs., Inc., the debtors’ plan provided for 
a combination of reduced collateral and partial immediate payment to be provided to the secured 
creditors, rather than for the sale of the secured creditor’s collateral free and clear of liens. Id. at 326 
n.13. According to Judge Ambro, in CoreStates Bank the debtors’ cram-down plan sale could be 
confirmed under subsection (iii) because the debtors were not seeking to sell the secured creditors’ 
collateral free and clear of liens. Id. 
 152. Id. at 331. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 334. 
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estate and minimizing deficiency claims against other unencumbered 
assets.”155 
Judge Ambro also discussed the consequences of applying 
subsection (iii) to cram-down plan sales free and clear of liens.156 If 
bankruptcy courts allow a debtor to cram down a plan sale on the 
secured creditor without the right to credit bid, debtors will pursue 
confirmation under subsection (iii) where it is advantageous to the 
debtor, even where such a sale does not maximize value for the estate,157 
thus undermining the fundamental policies of the Bankruptcy Code “by 
skewing the incentives of the debtor to maximize benefits for insiders, 
not creditors.”158 Moreover, if a cram-down plan sale can be achieved by 
a debtor outside of subsection (ii), then a secured creditor’s collateral 
may be undervalued and the secured creditor may “lose the only 
undervaluation protection Congress provided and considered in the sale-
free-of-liens scenario.”159 
The dissent also noted that secured creditors take into account the 
protections provided under the Bankruptcy Code, including the right to 
credit bid, before extending credit to a borrower, and that the majority’s 
ruling, which is a departure from established expectations of secured 
lenders, harms this right.160 Judge Ambro warned that secured creditors, 
in order to account for the possibility of being denied their right to credit 
bid, may provide an upward adjustment to their pricing, which will lead 
to higher interest rates for borrowers or to reduced credit availability.161 
The consequences of the Third Circuit’s decision “include upsetting 
three decades of secured creditors’ expectations, thus increasing the cost 
of credit.”162 
Judge Ambro also commented on the particular facts of the case 
and noted that the only party that would benefit from undervaluation of 
the collateral at the auction is the purchaser of the assets, ostensibly 
Philly Papers, the stalking-horse bidder with substantial insider and 
equity ties to the debtors.163 According to Judge Ambro, the stalking-
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 336. 
 157. Id. (“If the debtors here prevail, a direct consequence is that debtors generally would pursue 
confirmation under clause (ii) only if they somehow concluded that providing a right to credit bid as 
required by that clause would be more advantageous to them than denying that right.”). 
 158. Id. at 337. 
 159. Id. at 334. 
 160. Id. at 337 (“[S]ecured credit lowers the costs of lending transactions not only by increasing the 
strength of the lender’s legal right to force the borrower to pay, but also . . . by limiting the borrower’s 
ability to engage in conduct that lessens the likelihood of repayment.” (alternation in original) 
(quoting Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 683 
(1997))). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 338. 
 163. Id. at 336. 
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horse bidder appeared to be attempting to purchase the assets as cheaply 
as possible—an outcome that is more likely if the lenders are deprived of 
the right to credit bid at the auction.164 Though the lenders could submit a 
cash bid at the auction, which essentially would be writing a check to 
themselves, Judge Ambro pointed out that there are coordination 
difficulties involved in a large syndicated loan that could present 
obstacles to multiple lenders making an effective cash bid.165 
As did the majority, Judge Ambro emphasized that the Third 
Circuit’s decision did not finally determine whether the lenders are 
receiving fair and equitable treatment under the proposed chapter 11 
plan:  
  In any event, I do not take the majority opinion to preclude the 
Bankruptcy Court from finding, as a factual matter, that the debtors’ 
plan is a thinly veiled way for insiders to retain control of an insolvent 
company minus the debt burden the insiders incurred in the first place. 
Nor do I take the majority opinion to preclude the Bankruptcy Court 
from concluding, at the confirmation hearing, that the plan (and 
resulting proposed sale of assets free of liens and without credit bidding) 
does not meet the overarching “fair and equitable” requirement.166 
IV.  A Circuit Split: The Seventh Circuit Rejects PHILADELPHIA 
NEWSPAPERS and Protects the Right to Credit Bid at Plan Sales 
The momentum of the recent trend in courts of appeals toward 
denying secured creditors the right to credit bid at chapter 11 plan sales 
upon a finding that the sale otherwise provides the secured creditor with 
the indubitable equivalent of its secured claim was abruptly halted when 
the Seventh Circuit rejected the reasoning of Philadelphia Newspapers in 
River Road Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank.167 
River Road Hotel Partners, LLC, and certain related entities filed 
chapter 11 petitions in the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois in 2009.168 In 2007 and 2008, the River Road entities built the 
InterContinental Chicago O’Hare Hotel, which opened in 2008.169 In 
order to construct the hotel, the River Road entities obtained from 
certain lenders construction loans of approximately $155.5 million 
secured by a mortgage on the hotel property.170 The loan documents 
designated Amalgamated Bank as the administrative agent and trustee 
for those lenders.171 Several months after the opening of the hotel, and 
 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 337. 
 166. Id. at 338 n.22. 
 167. Nos. 10-3597, 10-3598, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13131, at *19 (7th Cir. June 28, 2011). 
 168. Id. at *5. 
 169. Id. at *2. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
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after defaulting on certain interest payments on the loans,172 the River 
Road entities requested additional funding from the same lenders so that 
they could complete construction of the restaurant located in the hotel 
and make certain payments to general contractors and suppliers.173 When 
the parties could not agree on the terms and conditions of the additional 
funding, the River Road debtors filed chapter 11 petitions.174 As of the 
petition date, the River Road debtors owed at least $140 million on the 
construction loans.175 
In a separate matter, RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, and certain of 
its related entities filed chapter 11 petitions in the Bankruptcy Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois on the same day that the River Road 
debtors filed their petitions.176 In 2007, RadLAX purchased the Radisson 
Hotel at Los Angeles International Airport.177 In order to purchase the 
Radisson, make certain renovations, and construct a parking structure, 
the RadLAX entities obtained a construction loan in the approximate 
amount of $142 million from certain lenders.178 Amalgamated Bank 
served as administrative agent and trustee for the lenders, which held a 
mortgage on the hotel property.179 Prior to the completion of the 
construction for the parking structure, the RadLAX entities ran out of 
funding for the project due to unexpected costs and were forced to cease 
construction.180 Despite negotiations, the parties could not agree on terms 
and conditions for additional funding, resulting in the filing of chapter 11 
petitions by the RadLAX debtors.181 As of the petition date, the 
RadLAX debtors owed at least $120 million on the loans.182 
In June 2010, the River Road debtors and the RadLAX debtors 
filed their respective plans of reorganization, each plan providing for the 
sale at public auction of substantially all of the debtors’ assets free and 
clear of the respective lenders’ security interests, with the sale proceeds 
to be distributed among creditors in accordance with their priorities 
under the Bankruptcy Code.183 The debtors in both cases also filed 
 
 172. Id. at *2–3 n.2. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at *3. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at *5. 
 177. Id. at *3–4. 
 178. Id. at *4. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. The cases of the RadLAX debtors were jointly administered by the bankruptcy court. Id. 
at *5. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC’s and River Rd. Expansion Partners, LLC’s Joint Chapter 
11 Plan, In re River Hotel Partners, LLC, No. 09-B-30029 (Bankr. N.D. III. June 4, 2010); Debtors’ 
Joint Chapter 11 Plan, In re RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, No. 09-30047 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 4, 
2010). 
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substantially similar motions to approve bidding procedures for the asset 
sales, which required that any qualified bidder fund its purchase in cash 
and expressly precluded the secured lenders from credit bidding for the 
assets.184 In particular, both proposed bidding procedures included the 
following statement: 
The Plan sale is being conducted under sections 1123(a) and (b) and 
1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Bankruptcy Code, and not section 363 of the 
Bankruptcy Code. As such, no holder of a lien on any assets of the 
Debtors shall be permitted to credit bid pursuant to section 363(k) of 
the Bankruptcy Code.185 
The debtors’ proposed bidding procedures, which were subject to 
court approval, also provided for the sale of the assets to the highest 
bidder.186 The initial bid in each case would be supplied by a stalking-
horse bidder arranged during the chapter 11 cases.187 The River Road 
stalking-horse bid was in the approximate amount of $42 million and the 
RadLAX stalking-horse bid was in the approximate amount of $47.5 
million.188 
Amalgamated Bank, on behalf of the lenders, filed objections to the 
proposed bidding procedures.189 The bank argued that the secured 
lenders had not accepted the chapter 11 plans and, therefore, that the 
plans could not be confirmed because they provided for the sale of the 
lenders’ collateral free and clear of liens without providing the lenders 
with the right to credit bid their claims as required by subsection (ii) of 
section 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.190 In response, the 
debtors argued that the plans were “fair and equitable” because, though 
the lenders were not provided the right to credit bid their claims under 
the proposed bidding procedures, the lenders would receive the 
indubitable equivalent of their claims under subsection (iii).191 
 
 184. See Debtors’ Motion for an Order: (A) Approving Procedures for the Sale of Substantially 
All of the Debtors’ Assets; (B) Scheduling an Auction; (C) Approving Assumption and Assignment 
Procedures; (D) Approving Form of Notice; and (E) Granting Related Relief at 21, In re River Rd. 
Hotel Partners, LLC, No. 09-B-30029 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 4, 2010); Debtors’ Motion for an Order: 
(A) Approving Procedures for the Sale of Substantially all of the Debtors’ Assets; (B) Scheduling an 
Auction; (C) Approving Assumption and Assignment Procedures; (D) Approving Form of Notice; 
and (E) Granting Related Relief at 21, In re RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, No. 09-30047 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. June 4, 2010). 
 185. Debtors’ Motion for an Order, In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, supra note 184, at 16; Debtors’ 
Motion for an Order, In re RadLAX Gateway Hotel, supra note 184, at 15. 
 186. See Debtors’ Motion for an Order, In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, supra note 184, at 12; 
Debtors’ Motion for an Order, In re RadLAX Gateway Hotel, supra note 184, at 10. 
 187. See Debtors’ Motion for an Order, In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, supra note 184, at 9; 
Debtors’ Motion for an Order, In re RadLAX Gateway Hotel, supra note 184, at 7. 
 188. River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank (In re River Road Hotel Partners, 
LLC), 651 F.3d 642, 645 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. In the alternative, the debtors argued that “cause” existed under sections 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) 
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The bankruptcy court denied the debtors’ respective motions 
seeking approval of the bidding procedures, finding that the chapter 11 
plans could not be confirmed as “fair and equitable” because they sought 
to sell the lenders’ assets free and clear of liens under subsection (iii), 
rather than under subsection (ii).192 The bankruptcy court held that the 
sale of the lenders’ assets free and clear of liens under a cram-down plan 
sale must comply with subsection (ii), thereby providing the lenders with 
the right to credit bid their claims at the asset sales.193 In reaching its 
decision, the bankruptcy court found “Judge Ambro’s well reasoned 
dissent in Philadelphia Newspapers . . . persuasive.”194 
Upon the debtors’ motion, the bankruptcy court, noting that the 
issue was “a matter of public importance,” certified the decision for 
direct appeal to the Court of Appeals in the River Road and RadLAX 
bankruptcy cases.195 In its certification, the bankruptcy judge wrote,  
Under current economic conditions a large portion of chapter 11 cases 
involving commercial real property progress to a sale of assets rather 
than to reorganization, and many of those sales involve lenders who 
are owed more than the property is worth. Whether such lenders can 
credit bid is crucial to the outcome of the sales.196  
The Seventh Circuit consolidated the River Road and RadLAX 
direct appeals, affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order, and held that cram-
down plan sales for encumbered assets free and clear of liens at an auction 
must satisfy the requirements set forth in subsection 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) of 
the Bankruptcy Code, rather than subsection (iii), affording secured 
creditors the right to credit bid at plan sales.197 In considering the prior 
decisions of the Third and Fifth Circuits, the Seventh Circuit commented, 
“Given that the Debtors’ assets in this case have not gone through the 
judicial valuation process and the Debtors’ reorganization plans involve 
using an auction to determine the assets’ current value, it is clear that 
 
and 363(k) to deny the lenders the right to credit bid because, among other things, the credit bids 
would chill the bidding process. The court held an evidentiary hearing in connection with the debtors’ 
argument and found that the debtors had failed to provide any specific evidence showing that the 
lenders’ credit bids would chill the bidding process. See id. at 644. 
 192. See id. 
 193. See id. 
 194. See Bankruptcy Court Order Denying Debtors’ Bid Procedures Motion, In re River Rd. 
Hotel Partners, LLC (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2010) (No. 09-B-30029), 2010 WL 6634603 at *3. 
 195. See Certification for Direct Appeal to Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit at 2, In re 
River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2010) (No. 09-B-30029); see also 28 U.S.C. 
§158(d) (2010) (providing for direct appeals to the applicable court of appeals). 
 196. See Certification for Direct Appeal to Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit at 2–3, In re 
River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2010) (No. 09-B-30029). 
 197. In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, 651 F.3d at 645, 653. Prior to its review of the substantive 
appeals, the Seventh Circuit denied the lenders’ argument that the issues raised in the debtors’ appeals 
were moot. Id. at 645–47. 
Resnick_63-HLJ-323 (Do Not Delete) 1/24/2012 6:05 PM 
352 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:323 
Philadelphia Newspapers is more relevant precedent than Pacific 
Lumber.”198 
As did Judge Ambro in his dissent in Philadelphia Newspapers, the 
Seventh Circuit found that section 1129(b)(2)(A) is not unambiguous 
and that there are two plausible interpretations on the question of 
“whether Subsection (iii) can be used to confirm any type of plan or if it 
can only be used to confirm plans that propose disposing of assets in 
ways that can be distinguished from those covered by Subsections (i) 
and (ii).”199 
The Seventh Circuit also noted that a secured creditor, without the 
opportunity to credit bid, will not necessarily receive the indubitable 
equivalent of its claims pursuant to a cram-down plan sale that provides 
the secured creditor with the proceeds from the sale:200 “Nothing in the 
text of Section 1129(b)(2)(A) indicates that plans that might provide 
secured lenders with the indubitable equivalent of their claims can be 
confirmed under Subsection (iii).”201 The Seventh Circuit further stated 
that an auction that prohibits credit bidding might not provide the 
indubitable equivalent of the secured claim because such a plan sale 
would not provide a “crucial check against undervaluation.”202 The court 
listed a number of factors that create substantial risk that assets sold at 
such a bankruptcy auction will be undervalued: (1) the speed and timing 
of a bankruptcy auction, (2) the inability to provide sufficient notice to 
interested parties, (3) an inherent risk of self-dealing on the part of 
existing management, (4) the current state of limited liquidity likely to 
keep potential bidders on the sidelines, and (5) the cost of putting 
together a bid, which is taken into consideration when setting the amount 
of a bid.203 
Applying canons of statutory interpretation, the Seventh Circuit 
found that a cram-down plan providing for an asset sale can be 
confirmed as fair and equitable only under subsection 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), 
rather than under subsection (iii).204 Otherwise, subsection (iii) would 
render subsection (ii) superfluous.205 The Seventh Circuit found that 
cram-down plan sales can only qualify as “fair and equitable” under 
subsection (iii) if such plans provide for the disposition of assets in ways 
that are not already included in subsections (i) and (ii).206 To support its 
finding, the court cited legislative history indicating that Congressional 
 
 198. Id. at 649 n.4. 
 199. Id. at 648–50. 
 200. Id.  
 201. Id. at 651. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 651 n.6. 
 204. Id. at 652. 
 205. Id.  
 206. Id. 
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intent in drafting section 1129(b)(2)(A) was to provide three distinct 
avenues to provide “fair and equitable” treatment pursuant to 
subsections (i) through (iii).207 
Following the reasoning of Judge Ambro’s dissent in Philadelphia 
Newspapers, the Seventh Circuit also found that depriving secured 
creditors of the right to credit bid at plan sales would conflict with other 
protections provided by the Bankruptcy Code for the benefit of the 
secured creditor.208 Namely, the protections provided pursuant to sections 
363(k) and 1111(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, when viewed together, 
protect the secured creditor where the debtor either seeks to sell the 
asset that secures the secured creditor’s debt free and clear of its lien or 
to retain possession of the encumbered asset.209 Consequently, the court 
held that cram-down plans that contemplate selling encumbered assets 
free and clear of liens at an auction must satisfy the requirements set 
forth in section 1129(b)(2)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code, which includes an 
opportunity to credit bid.210 
The RadLAX debtors filed a petition for certiorari, which was 
granted by the Supreme Court.211 
V.  Potential Consequences of PACIFIC LUMBER and 
PHILADELPHIA NEWSPAPERS 
It is too early to know all of the effects of the decisions of the courts 
of appeals in Pacific Lumber and Philadelphia Newspapers, although 
changes in practice have been observed already. The importance and 
effects of those decisions, which can deprive secured creditors of the 
right to credit bid at asset sales under a chapter 11 plan, will depend on 
whether the Supreme Court adopts the reasoning of these decisions and, 
if so, on how secured creditors alter their behavior. 
A. Will the Supreme Court Adopt the Reasoning of PACIFIC LUMBER 
and PHILADELPHIA NEWSPAPERS? 
As emphasized by Judge Ambro in his dissent in Philadelphia 
Newspapers, the overwhelming majority of courts that have considered 
the issue during the past three decades have held that the right to credit 
bid at asset sales under a chapter 11 plan must be assured in order to 
cram down a plan against a class of secured creditors. Indeed, the 
Seventh Circuit has adopted that view in River Road.212 It remains to be 
seen, however, whether the Supreme Court will adopt the views of the 
 
 207. Id. at 652 n.8. 
 208. Id. at 652–63. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 653. 
 211. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, No. 11-166 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2011). 
 212. In re River Rd. Hotel Partners, 651 F.3d at 653. 
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Third and Fifth Circuits in departing from that entrenched view. In any 
event, until the Court resolves the issue, there will be attempts in other 
circuits to obtain court approval of bidding procedures in connection 
with the sale of assets under a plan that deprives secured creditors of the 
right to credit bid. Of course, unless and until the Supreme Court 
resolves the circuit split, it is likely that debtors planning to resort to 
chapter 11 to effectuate a sale of assets without affording secured 
creditors the right to credit bid will engage in forum shopping.213 
B. Plan Sales Instead of Section 363 Sales 
Pacific Lumber and Philadelphia Newspapers should not affect sales 
of assets under section 363(b) effectuated before a chapter 11 plan is 
confirmed. Courts have not held that providing a secured creditor with 
the indubitable equivalent of its secured claim constitutes “cause” for 
depriving a secured creditor of the right to credit bid under section 363(k). 
In contrast, in the Third and Fifth Circuits, the indubitable equivalent is a 
substitute for the right to credit bid only upon the transfer of collateral 
free and clear of the secured creditor’s lien under the terms of a chapter 
11 plan.214 Therefore, debtors desiring to sell assets without credit bidding 
may wait to effectuate the sale under a plan, rather than under section 
363(b) prior to plan confirmation. However, section 363 sales are 
generally more expedient and can be achieved early in a chapter 11 case. 
Thus, in the Third and Fifth Circuits, as well as other jurisdictions that 
follow the views of those circuits, in addition to weighing both the 
advantages and disadvantages of avoiding credit bidding in the particular 
circumstances, debtors will need to weigh the benefits of expediency that 
section 363 provides in contrast to a prolonged plan confirmation and 
sale process. This is especially true where the collateral is a rapidly 
wasting asset that needs to be sold quickly to achieve maximum value. 
C. Round-Tripping Cash Bids for Assets Sold Under a Plan 
The denial of the right to credit bid at an auction for property free 
and clear of liens does not deprive a secured creditor of the right to make 
a cash bid at the auction. If the secured creditor is the highest bidder, it 
will purchase its own collateral for cash with its lien attaching to the 
proceeds.215 As a practical matter, the secured creditor would be paying 
 
 213. See 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2010) (stating the requirements for venue in bankruptcy cases). 
 214. In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 559 F.3d at 298, 310 (3d Cir. 2010); Bank of N.Y. Trust Co. v. 
Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 246 (5th Cir. 2009); see 
also supra note 102. 
 215. In fact, the secured lenders group in Philadelphia Newspapers, after losing the appeal in the 
Third Circuit, submitted the highest and best bid at the auction and purchased the property with a 
$105 million cash bid. See Sophia Pearson et al., Philadelphia Inquirer Lenders Win Bankruptcy 
Auction with $139 Million Bid, Bloomberg (Apr. 29, 2010, 9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
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cash only to receive it back. Though a chapter 11 plan can provide for 
payment to the secured creditor over time, in such an event the secured 
creditor would be entitled to interest on such payments to compensate it 
for the time value of money.216 Thus, credit bidding and cash bidding 
eventually should have substantially the same economic effect to secured 
creditors. 
For example, if collateral securing a $15 million claim is to be sold 
free and clear of liens under a chapter 11 plan and the universe of 
bidders is willing to bid no more than $10 million for the collateral, but 
the secured creditor makes a cash bid of $11 million, the secured creditor 
will receive the collateral and will have a security interest in the $11 
million cash proceeds of the collateral. The cash proceeds either will be 
paid to the secured creditor or will be otherwise returned in some form 
that will protect the $11 million interest so that the creditor will realize 
the indubitable equivalent of its secured claim. In essence, the secured 
creditor will be recycling the cash—paying it to the debtor only for it to 
be paid back to the secured creditor. Viewed in this manner, at first 
glance the deprivation of the right to credit bid may not seem to be a 
substantial economic loss. 
If the secured creditor is a single bank or hedge fund or a small 
group of lenders, a cash bid may be feasible. However, in today’s modern 
financing environment, it is common for lenders to consist of a syndicate 
of banks represented by an agent, holders of debt securities in a 
securitization vehicle represented by a trustee or loan servicer, or some 
other structure with multiple claim holders participating in the credit 
facility. In such cases, a collective action by the “lender” may require a 
vote of the holders of claims and, in any case, there may be no 
mechanism to compel holders to contribute the cash necessary to make a 
cash bid. The lack of a way to compel multiple owners of the secured 
debt under sophisticated lending vehicles to make a further investment 
of cash could be an obstacle to making a cash bid. 
In addition, if the lender does not have sufficient liquidity to make a 
cash bid or needs to incur short-term borrowing costs or sacrifice short-
term opportunity costs with regard to other potential uses of that money, 
the need to make a cash bid instead of a credit bid could prove costly for 
the lender. Moreover, if the bankruptcy court finds that a judicial valuation 
of the collateral in lieu of credit bidding satisfies the “indubitable 
equivalent” standard of section 1129(b)(2)(B)(iii), as did the court in 
Pacific Lumber, there will be no auction at which a cash bid could be 
made. Therefore, depriving secured creditors of the right to credit bid 
 
2010-04-28/philadelphia-inquirer-lenders-group-wins-bankrupcty-auction-over-perelman.html. 
 216. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) (2010). 
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may, as a practical matter, deprive them of any kind of bidding or may 
increase the costs of making a bid. 
D. Bargaining for the Right to Credit Bid as a Condition to 
Providing Debtor-in-Possession Financing or Consenting to the 
Use of Cash Collateral 
Prebankruptcy secured lenders willing to provide debtor-in-
possession (“DIP”) financing to provide liquidity to a company in 
chapter 11 often have significant bargaining power in negotiating the 
terms of the financing agreement.217 It is not surprising, therefore, that 
such lenders usually negotiate for a certain amount of control over the 
bankruptcy case.218 For example, DIP lenders often demand that the DIP 
financing agreement, as well as the court order approving it, provide that 
the loan may be accelerated in the event that the debtor does not file a 
plan, or that the court fails to confirm a plan, within a certain time 
period, unless the lender consents to an extension of time.219 Filing a plan 
that does not have the secured lender’s approval may also constitute an 
event of default by the debtor so as to result in the acceleration of the 
loan agreement.220 It is not surprising, therefore, that following Pacific 
Lumber and Philadelphia Newspapers, secured lenders have demanded 
that, as a condition to providing DIP financing, their loan agreements 
expressly provide that in the event of a sale of the collateral the secured 
lender shall have the right to credit bid.221 Alternatively, the loan 
agreement could provide that the filing of any plan by the debtor that 
provides for the sale of the collateral without affording the lender the 
right to credit bid shall be an event of default that accelerates the DIP 
financing. 
When a trustee or debtor in possession wants to use cash collateral 
during the bankruptcy case, either consent of the secured creditor with 
an interest in the cash collateral must be obtained or the court must 
permit such use based on the secured creditor’s adequate protection.222 
As a condition to providing such consent, secured lenders recently have 
insisted on a court order providing that the secured lender shall have the 
right to credit bid in the event of a sale of the collateral under a chapter 11 
 
 217. See id. § 364 on obtaining credit. 
 218. Christopher W. Frost, Corporate Governance in Insolvency and Bankruptcy: A Collier 
Monograph § 5 [2][a] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 2011). 
 219. Id. 
 220. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001(c)(1)(B)(vi), which recognizes that financing agreements may 
establish deadlines for filing a plan of reorganization, for approval of a disclosure statement, for a 
hearing on confirmation of a plan, or for entry of a confirmation order. 
 221. See, e.g., In re Loehmann's Holdings, Inc., Nos. 10-16077–10-16081, slip op. at 22 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2010); In re Blockbuster Inc., Nos. 10-14997, slip op. at 47 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
23, 2010).  
 222. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2), (e) (2010). For a definition of “cash collateral,” see id. § 363(a). 
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plan.223 For example, in In re Magic Brands, LLC,224 the order authorizing 
the debtor in possession to obtain postpetition financing and to use of 
cash collateral provided: 
The Prepetition Agent (on behalf of the Prepetition Secured Parties) 
shall have the right to “credit bid” the amount of the Prepetition 
Secured Parties’ claims as of the date of such bid during any sale of all 
or substantially all of the Debtor’s assets, including without limitation, 
sales occurring pursuant to section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code or 
included as part of any restructuring plan subject to confirmation 
under section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Bankruptcy Code.225 
The practice of demanding the right to credit bid as a condition to 
financing or to consent for the use of cash collateral will undoubtedly 
grow and such provisions are likely to become boilerplate language in 
any such agreement. However, if a secured creditor is not willing, or even 
asked, to provide postpetition financing to the debtor or to consent to 
the use of its cash collateral, courts following Pacific Lumber or 
Philadelphia Newspapers may allow plan proponents effectively to 
deprive secured creditors of the right to credit bid. 
E. Increasing Litigation on the Application of the “Indubitable 
Equivalent” Standard and Its Impact on the Bidding Process 
Before 2009, when the right to credit bid at asset sales under a 
chapter 11 plan was virtually assured, bidders assumed the risk that a 
secured creditor might outbid them. Nonetheless, potential bidders were 
willing to compete with the secured creditor on those terms. Though 
litigation occasionally ensued over the bidding process, there were fewer 
disputes to resolve because the highest and best offer would win the day. 
However, since Pacific Lumber and Philadelphia Newspapers, if a 
proposed sale of collateral under a chapter 11 plan does not have the 
secured creditor’s support, and the court substitutes a judicial valuation 
for the right to credit bid at an auction or approves bidding procedures 
that require all bidders, including secured creditors, to make cash bids, 
the court must determine that the judicial valuation or the sales price 
received would give the secured creditor, in fact and as a matter of law, 
the indubitable equivalent of the creditor’s secured claim.226 In the case of 
an auction, the court would have to be satisfied that the auction process 
was fair and reasonable in its quest to find the highest and best offer. For 
that reason, bidders engaging in such auctions may anticipate uncertainty 
 
 223. See, e.g., In re Blockbuster Inc., No. 10-14997, slip op. at 7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2010); In 
re ClearPoint Bus. Res., Inc., No. 10-12037, slip op. at 7 (Bankr. D. Del. July 14, 2010); In re Magic 
Brands, LLC, No. 10-11310, slip op. at 21 (Bankr. D. Del. May 17, 2010). 
 224. No. 10-11310, slip op. at 21. 
 225. Id. 
 226. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2010). 
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and delay resulting from litigation initiated by secured creditors on the 
question of whether the auction process actually produced the 
indubitable equivalent of the secured creditors’ claim. It is possible that 
the greater uncertainty regarding the indubitable equivalent issue and 
the likelihood that the parties will litigate over these issues will result in 
fewer parties willing to spend the time and expense necessary to 
productively engage in the auction process. Thus, the uncertainty and 
litigation environment that these decisions will cause in jurisdictions 
following Pacific Lumber and Philadelphia Newspapers could have a 
chilling effect on bidding at auction sales. 
In contrast, it is possible that the elimination of credit bidding may 
induce more people to engage in the bidding process because they will no 
longer have the risk that the secured creditor will obtain the asset merely 
by providing a higher credit bid. Secured creditors may no longer have 
the advantage of being able to credit bid the amount of their debt 
without having to use additional currency. Therefore, with respect to the 
willingness of potential purchasers and investors to participate in the 
auction process, it remains to be seen whether the discouraging risk of 
litigation, delay, and uncertainty regarding the application of the 
indubitable equivalent issue will be outweighed by the encouraging 
absence of competition from credit-bidding secured creditors. However, 
even if the absence of credit bidding would encourage others to 
participate in the auction process, it would not necessarily result in a 
price equal to, or exceeding, the price that would be paid if the auction 
procedures were to allow credit bidding.227 
F. Increasing the Cost or Reducing the Availability of Secured 
Credit 
In his dissenting opinion in Philadelphia Newspapers, Judge Ambro 
warned that the consequences of depriving secured creditors of the right 
to credit bid at sales under chapter 11 plans “forces future secured 
creditors to adjust their pricing accordingly, potentially raising interest 
rates or reducing credit availability to account for the possibility of a sale 
without credit bidding.”228 Though Judge Ambro’s warning is a 
reasonable prediction, forecasting the future behavior of lenders is an 
uncertain endeavor and it remains to be seen whether the loss of credit 
bidding in plan sales, in and of itself, will have such an effect. 
 
 227. When rejecting the notion that allowing credit bidding chills others from cash bidding, Judge 
Ambro stated that “credit bidding chills cash bidding no more than a deep-pocketed cash bidder 
would chill less-well-capitalized cash bidders.” In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC 599 F.3d 298, 321 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
 228. Id. at 337. Judge Ambro also wrote that the consequences of denying the right to credit bid 
“include upsetting three decades of secured creditors’ expectations, thus increasing the cost of credit.” 
Id. at 338. 
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If bankruptcy courts in the Third and Fifth Circuits, or in other 
jurisdictions adopting the views of those circuits, strictly apply a high 
“indubitable equivalent” standard—which must be met if an objecting 
class of secured creditors is to be deprived of the right to credit bid—it is 
possible that courts will allow plans that deny the right to credit bid only 
in a small minority of cases. This is especially so in the Third Circuit, 
where the appeals court left the door open in Philadelphia Newspapers to 
a subsequent finding by the bankruptcy court on remand that the secured 
lenders would not be adequately protected under the particular facts of 
the case without credit bidding.229 In addition, opportunities for some 
secured creditors to negotiate for credit bidding rights as part of DIP 
financing or cash collateral arrangements, and the opportunity for some 
other lenders to make round-tripping cash bids, collectively may provide 
sufficient protection for secured lenders generally so that any increased 
litigation costs and losses to secured creditors caused by undervaluation 
of collateral—either by faulty judicial valuations or inadequate auction 
procedures—might not have a substantial effect, or any effect, on interest 
rates or the availability of secured credit. In any event, it is too soon to 
speculate on the impact the decisions of the Third and Fifth Circuits will 
have on interest rates and the availability of credit if the Supreme Court 
adopts the views of those courts. 
It is also possible that Pacific Lumber and Philadelphia Newspapers 
may have some effect on the prices paid for secured claims in the 
secondary market, especially for private equity investors purchasing 
secured claims at huge discounts with the expectation of credit bidding 
for substantially all assets of the company. It is doubtful, however, that 
the mere possibility of the loss of the right to credit bid in connection 
with a plan sale will deter distressed investors from engaging in the 
business of claims trading. 
Conclusion 
Whenever protections for secured creditors are enhanced in the 
chapter 11 process, such as by imposing tighter controls in DIP financing 
arrangements, debtors are more restricted when designing plans to 
achieve a successful reorganization or the most efficient and effective 
sale of assets. Conversely, when secured creditor protections are relaxed, 
such as by depriving them of the right to credit bid and exposing them to 
greater risk of undervaluation of their collateral, debtors and other plan 
proponents are afforded greater flexibility in designing chapter 11 plans. 
Thus, to some extent, recent Third and Fifth Circuit decisions chipping 
away at the right to credit bid have shifted the rights of lien holders as 
against the rights of financially troubled borrowers in a way that affords 
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greater flexibility to debtors. Though it is too early to know the impact of 
this rebalancing on the cost of credit or the behavior of secured creditors 
or claims purchasers—or even whether the Supreme Court will follow 
the lead of the Third and Fifth Circuits, rather than the Seventh Circuit, 
and allow all-cash bidding procedures or judicial valuation to substitute 
for credit bidding—the loss of the right to credit bid at plan sales tips the 
scales toward debtors when formulating and negotiating chapter 11 plans 
that provide for the sale of assets. 
